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The judicial reception of EU law in the new Member States presents itself as a rather 
attractive topic for academic research. It covers an exciting, and sometimes controversial, 
period of legal transformation, it has direct practical relevance for domestic law and 
governance, there are always plenty of legal developments and other new information 
available, and it allows EU lawyers to shine in matters which at times dominate domestic 
legal and political debates. The trouble with this topic is that it has been stubbornly resistant 
to comprehensive theory-making. Also, its analysis in a coherent framework, on account of 
the diversity of developments even in a single jurisdiction and as a result of the variety of 
potential factors explaining those developments, presents a challenge even to the most 
seasoned researcher. There is always the danger that analytical accounts of the relevant 
domestic jurisprudence turn into lengthy reports of what happened in different judgments in 
different cases and leave authors struggling with juggling theory, analysis and empirical 
evidence. 
 Tatjana Evas’ book has a lot to offer to both laic readers and experts in post-accession 
legal developments in the new Member States. It contains a comprehensive overview of the 
case law of Estonian and Latvian courts in which questions of EU law were raised and 
addressed. This was carried out following a threefold conceptual and theoretical framework 
which includes general legal theory, Europeanization theories and the theoretical instruments 
used in the EU enlargement literature. From this background, the book developed a unique 
and elaborate analytical framework which looked at the national jurisprudence from the 
perspective of the principle and systemic requirement of coherence. Coherence was 
understood in substantive, institutional and argumentative terms, and it was examined in its 
different manifestations as norms, institutions, and values/discursive-argumentative 
perspectives. In the author’s intentions, this framework should enable the characterisation of 
the performance of Estonian and Latvian courts as demonstrating ability or inability in the 
application of EU law, as being slow-starters, and as resisting the application of EU law. 
 Placing coherence at the centre of the discussion on the reception of EU law by 
Estonian and Latvian courts does, however, have its drawbacks for analysis and debate. It has 
led to the book focusing predominantly on national courts in the application of EU law 
resolving conflicts between national and EU law and side-lining, although not entirely, other, 
equally relevant issues relating to the design and quality of the process of judicial reception. 
Even though the ability of national courts to observe the commands following from the 
principles of supremacy and direct effect are crucial to the actual application of EU law on 
the domestic level, exploring matters which may only indirectly influence the coherence of 
the EU legal order, such as complacency in judicial reasoning, the tendency of courts 
ignoring legal complexities, judges lacking detailed and current knowledge, or the 
unwillingness to set up robust structures for continuing judicial training, could result in a 
more profound, and perhaps contextual, understanding of the adjustment required from 
national courts. Also, the theoretical and analytical framework proposed in the book focusing 
on coherence assumed competent institutional actors, which on both sides seem to pursue 
more or less corresponding agendas and adhere to corresponding institutional biases. This, 
unfortunately, left only limited room in the examination of the relevant case law for 
discussions on institutional factors which may debilitate the process of judicial reception and 
which are responsible for its quality and its prospects. Theory should not prevent recognizing 
that institutions may be unprepared and individuals may be incompetent and that systemic 
coherence may depend on such factors. Taking a more realistic view, when constructing the 
analytical framework for the book, on the capabilities of national courts (and on the fallibility 
of individual judges) would have introduced the later parts of the book more suitably where, 
the author having identified abundant positive and some negative practices in the judicial 
application of EU law in Estonia and Latvia, the mistakes committed and the gaps and the 
faults of judicial reasoning presented the main analytical findings. 
 Despite the necessity of constructing theories for the judicial reception of EU law in 
the new Member States, the commonality of applying EU law in domestic cases and the 
contingency of the reception process on the availability of suitable cases must not be 
overlooked. In the majority of cases before domestic courts, there should not be major issues 
threatening the coherence of the EU legal order, and there are only limited opportunities for 
national courts where they have to act as managers or coordinators of the national reception 
of EU law. Despite the occasional instances where national courts may be pressured to adopt 
what the book named as ‘analytical-persuasive’ interpretative approaches when applying EU 
law and where they need to reach out to the broader context of legal norms, the everyday 
application of EU law requires national courts to follow the straightforward practices of 
acknowledging rules and their authority and applying them to the facts of the case before 
them. Indeed, the book revealed only very few instances in which the performance of 
Estonian and Latvian courts raised the necessity of fundamental adjustments on account of 
practices which threatened to undermine the coherence and effective application of EU law. 
The reception of EU law by the judiciaries of the new Member States is, on the whole, devoid 
of great revelations and surprises, and the most significant problems in that process simply 
require that national courts, in Lord Denning’s words, ‘get down to it.’ 
 Disputably, the book selected rather general assumptions concerning the institutional 
culture and operating practices of Estonian and Latvian courts as a point of departure for its 
analysis. The author made clear commitments to reveal national specialities and 
post-Communist flavours in the jurisprudence examined which, however, was not followed 
by convincing discussion and evidence that administrative and civil/commercial/other 
litigation in the two countries, or anywhere else in the ex-Socialist states of Central and 
Eastern Europe, would demonstrate such characteristics. It was not made particularly clear 
whether the alleged local specialities of judicial power in Estonia and Latvia follow from 
constitutional/legal, institutional, political, cultural, educational etc. factors and in what way 
those specialities would influence, assumedly to the detriment of the requirement of 
coherence, the application of EU regulations, directives, Treaty provisions and the case law. 
Generally, positivist approaches and textualism, and unreceptiveness towards systemic and 
teleological considerations are identified as indicators of a locally rooted judicial attitude and 
as remnants of Soviet legal culture. While this, as a generalization capable of enhancing the 
narrative of the book, could hold true, readers are not given assurance that similar approaches 
would not be standard practice elsewhere in the EU and that this, in fact, would be at odds 
with the tasks expected from national courts in the application of EU law having regard to the 
coherence of the EU legal order. 
 Discussions on the judicial reception of EU law in the new Member States must be 
particularly careful when they suggest a link between the success and effectiveness of the 
reception process and the ability of national courts to reproduce in their own jurisprudence 
the teleological and systemic rationales of the relevant doctrines of EU law as stated by the 
EU Court. Emphasis on domestic (and international) legal provisions and their primary 
meaning when national courts define in the domestic jurisprudence their role and obligations 
in the EU legal order does not necessarily indicate a lack of understanding from national 
courts of systemic considerations and should not in itself jeopardize the effective enforcement 
of EU law in the Member States. Textualism qualifies as prudent judicial practice when the 
direct applicability and enforceability of EU law follow from binding EU and national legal 
texts, and national courts should not be subjected to unqualified criticisms when they exploit 
that comfortable interpretative position. The book, nevertheless, rightly pointed out the legal 
and constitutional pitfalls of textualism and its potential negative impact on coherence in the 
application of EU law in the Member States. Interestingly, textualism and the other common 
mistake of domestic courts over-interpreting EU law doctrines can be regarded as presenting 
a more acute problem from the perspective of the coherence of national legal orders. While as 
a result of such interpretative practices EU doctrines may be distanced from their original 
rationales and their domestic reception could lead to potential conceptual distortions, overly 
generous, textually driven interpretations of far-reaching doctrines, such as the requirement 
of effectiveness of EU law, without considering their limitations as they follow from EU law 
could unnecessarily, and unlawfully, upset the structure, internal balances and fundamental 
doctrines of national legal orders. Experience shows that this is less a systemic problem, but 
more a matter of competence of individual judges. 
 The book rightly identified the limited discursiveness and persuasiveness of 
judgments from Estonian and Latvian courts as the central, essentially negative characteristic 
of the reception process. Although the book offered evidence to the contrary, especially 
concerning the active involvement of the respective national supreme courts in guiding and 
coordinating the application of EU law by lower national courts, the restricted language and 
narrative of judicial reasoning do seem to impact the quality and design of the reception of 
EU law in the two states and indicate a particular institutional attitude towards the judicial 
function. It is unlikely that the institutional adjustment necessitated by the application of EU 
law before national courts would be adequately facilitated by a reserved style and scope of 
judicial reasoning. The book, nevertheless, left the questions open whether judicial reticence 
would be a Central and Eastern European speciality and whether it could be explained by 
judicial complacency or by distorted institutional considerations rather than being 
characterized as the consequence of post-Communist socialization and institutional attitudes. 
 The fact that the book reported an overall undisturbed reception of the relevant EU 
principles and that the dominant problems identified related to the clarity and correctness of 
national court rulings, a more robust account of the softer, predominantly institutional factors 
influencing the judicial reception of EU law in the new Member States could have adequately 
supplemented the discussions of the book on the hard law. As revealed in Allan Tatham’s 
recent article on the experience of the Hungarian judiciary with EU law, training, individual 
expertise and language-skills have a significant impact on the application of EU law before 
national courts. The focus on the preparedness and competences of individual judges thus 
makes the coherence of the EU legal order a micro-level issue. Coherence could also be 
regarded as a matter for mid-level institutional decisions. The channelling of EU law cases, 
using rather conventional procedural and management instruments, to expert chambers in 
specialized courts, the hiring of EU law experts and researchers to support courts exposed to 
EU related litigation, or the flexible training and preparation of judges and courts when 
because of faulty regulation an influx of EU law driven litigation is expected could enable 
quality judicial performances in the application of EU law. The coherence of the EU legal 
order thus seems to depend on factors which the relevant EU law doctrines struggle to 
express. 
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